This confrontation between perceived local nationalist parochialism and what is wishfully understood to be Spanish broad-minded liberalism, as seems implied in the Economist's article, lies paradoxically in Catalan nationalism's historical endeavour to change the political structure of Spain, and Spanish nationalism's constant obstinacy in imposing it's unitary national identity (i.e. uniformity), while subduing that of Catalonia. It is obvious, thence, that the Spanish political mainstream, whether Socialist or PP, (never mind the old Francoists) has always been, in this sense, politically conservative and culturally unitary, opposing today's politically liberal and culturally diverse, multifarious milieu, whether local or global.
Herein lies the difficulty of Spain for the past 300 years. This Spain that has for centuries been unable to consolidate as a nation beyond the regions of Castilian culture (i.e. Spain not including Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia), even “by whichever means necessary”, be these outright war, attempted cultural and linguistic obliteration, or economic and fiscal seizure, is still today attempting to secure its uniform identity. The article mentions that “Catalan and Basque nationalism are creations of the late 19th century”. This is true, not only of Catalonia but also Spain, France, America, etc., if one accepts “nationalism” as described by orthodox modernists, such as Marxist philosopher Eric Hobsbawm or functionalists such as Ernest Gellner. But if one is to consider current trends of study, nationalism is not only a “modern” (i.e. 18th & 19th century) phenomenon, but it also has pre-modern origins, as described by Anthony D. Smith's thesis of ethnosymbolism. This is made clear by the history of Catalonia and its struggle for self-rule and its political activism, the history of which goes back a long way (see my Catalan Independence and Political Activism: A very brief history).
A closed, parochial society?
The parochial nationalism that is unable to adapt to post-modern society, with its radical reappraisal of modern assumptions about culture, identity, history, or language, is not in fact Catalan nationalism, but that of Spain. Catalonia, with its distinct singularity, has long been at the forefront of social, cultural and economic advancement, not only in Spain, but also in Europe. It is the most open society in Spain, with 13.5% of its population coming from abroad. Catalonia has long welcomed migrations: between the 16th and the 18th centuries, many French migrated there, escaping from religious strife and civil disturbances. During the last quarter of the 19th century and the whole of the 20th, Catalonia had a net influx of migrants. As of the late 1950s, while southern Europe, including Spain, was 'exporting' labour to the north, Catalonia was a net 'importer', like the UK or Germany. Between 1950 and 1975, the population of Catalonia grew by 75%, from 3.2 million to 5.6 million. In the first years of the 21st century, the foreign-born population has grown from 181,596 (2.9% of the total) in 2000 to 939,321 (13.1%) in 2006.
This obvious attraction felt by many hundreds of thousands of migrants does not say much for this image that some hope to sell of a closed, parochial society. Indeed, some months ago, Spanish (non-Catalan) tourist business leaders tried to put over the idea that having our own language somehow hurt our tourist industry. However, the Spanish 'region' that receives most tourists is in fact Catalonia, with 15 million visitors, 25% of the total received by Spain (2006, the last year for which official figures are available), followed by the Catalan-speaking Balearics, with 10.2 million foreign tourists. In other words, two regions with protectionist Catalan-language policies are the most successful in drawing foreign visitors.
Devolution or Federalism? Independence!
The Economist's article describes the estado de las autonomías as a successful process of devolution, and that there have been more and more transfers of powers over the last 30 years. But here lies another paradox: these transfers are no more, and are in fact less, than those that were stipulated by the 1979 Statute for Catalonia. The 2006 Statute was passed because it was clear that the process supposedly governed by the previous one had come to a standstill. Worse still is the fact that the date by which the financial arrangement for the new Statute was to come into force has come and gone, with the Spanish government still stalling on the issue.
Furthermore, devolution is, as described by Wikipedia...
“... the statutory granting of powers from the central government of a state to government at subnational level, such as a regional, local, or state level. It differs from federalism in that the powers devolved may be temporary and ultimately reside in central government, thus the state remains, de jure, unitary.
Any devolved parliaments or assemblies can be repealed by central government in the same way an ordinary statute can be. Federal systems, or federacies, differ in that state or provincial government is guaranteed in the constitution. Australia, Canada and the United States have federal systems, and have constitutions (as do some of their constituent states or provinces).”
The latter is, in my opinion and that of many Catalans, what should have been legislated after the Franco regime, but which was not for fear of the centuries-old demands of unitary uniformity by Spanish reactionary conservatives and the military. This was, after all, what had essentially led to Franco's military uprising and the Spanish civil war: the Catalans had been given an inch and had tried to take a mile. The democratic government of the nineteen-thirties had in many ways devolved more than today in the democratic give-and-take.
And there lies the question: How much is enough? Well, enough is what the citizens decide they want, isn't it? That is the whole point of democratic rule. The Catalan parliament voted for the new Statute by 90% of its members, and it was approved in referendum by the citizens with a clear majority in favour. But still the Spanish government procrastinates with its application.
If the Spanish powers-that-be are not yet ready to accept this, after thirty years of democracy and three hundred years of imposition, there isn't much point in carrying on with their ground rules. Independentists move, therefore, that Spain's solution, for both the Spanish and the Catalans, is Catalan independence.